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Abstract 
OBJECTIVE: 
Prevention trials for neurodegenerative diseases use genetic or other risk marker tests to select 
participants but there is concern that this could involve coercive disclosure of unwanted information. This 
has led some trials to use blinded enrollment (participants are tested but not told of their risk marker 
status). We examined the ethics of blinded vs transparent enrollment using well-established criteria for 
assessing the ethics of clinical research. 
METHODS: 
Normative analysis applying 4 key ethical criteria-favorable risk-benefit ratio, informed consent, fair 
subject selection, and scientific validity-to blinded vs transparent enrollment, using current evidence and 
state of Alzheimer disease (AD) and other prevention trials. 
RESULTS: 
Current evidence on the psychosocial impact of risk marker disclosure and considerations of scientific 
benefit do not support an obligation to use blinded enrollment in prevention trials. Nor does transparent 
enrollment coerce or involve undue influence of potential participants. Transparent enrollment does not 
unfairly exploit vulnerable participants or limit generalizability of scientific findings of prevention trials. 
However, if the preferences of a community of potential participants would affect the rigor or feasibility of 
a prevention trial using transparent enrollment, then investigators are required by considerations of 
scientific validity to use blinded enrollment. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
Considerations of risks and benefits, informed consent, and fair subject selection do not require the use 
of blinded enrollment for AD prevention trials. Blinded enrollment in AD prevention trials may sometimes 
be necessary because of the need for scientific validity, not because it prevents coercion or undue 
influence. 
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Abstract 
 
 
Objectives:  Prevention trials for neurodegenerative diseases use genetic or other risk marker tests to 
select participants but there is concern that this could involve coercive disclosure of unwanted 
information. This has led to some trials to use blinded enrollment (participants are tested but not told of 
their risk marker status). We examined the ethics of blinded versus transparent enrollment using well-
established criteria for assessing the ethics of clinical research. 
Methods:  Normative analysis applying 4 key ethical criteria—favorable risk-benefit ratio, informed 
consent, fair subject selection, and scientific validity—to blinded versus transparent enrollment, using 
current evidence and state of Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and other prevention trials. 
Results:  Current evidence on the psychosocial impact of risk marker disclosure and considerations of 
scientific benefit do not support an obligation to use blinded enrollment in prevention trials. Nor does 
transparent enrollment coerce or involve undue influence of potential participants.  Transparent 
enrollment does not unfairly exploit vulnerable participants or limit generalizability of scientific findings 
of prevention trials. However, if the preferences of community of potential participants would affect the 
rigor or feasibility of a prevention trial using transparent enrollment, then investigators are required by 
considerations of scientific validity to use blinded enrollment. 
Conclusions:  Considerations of risks and benefits, informed consent, and fair subject selection do not 
require the use of blinded enrollment for AD prevention trials.  Blinded enrollment in AD prevention 
trials may sometimes be necessary because of the need for scientific validity, not because it prevents 
coercion or undue influence. 
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Current guidelines recommend against testing for APOE mutations1 or PET amyloid 
imaging for predicting AD in asymptomatic persons,2 or support testing only within narrowly 
circumscribed conditions (e.g., for family or advance care planning) using nondirective 
counseling.3  Although the use of such risk markers in asymptomatic persons is problematic in 
the clinical context, such testing has become pivotal in research. The cumulative biological 
effects over a long pre-symptomatic period suggest that intervening much earlier4 in the process 
may be important to modifying the disease. This has led to ‘presymptomatic treatment’ or 
‘secondary prevention’ studies targeting asymptomatic persons identifiable by various risk 
markers.5-10 One ethical challenge of such studies is that they may test interventions with 
significant risks in persons who may never develop symptoms of dementia. 
This article focuses on another ethical challenge of such trials; namely, the potential risks 
and burdens of disclosing risk marker results to participants. The knowledge that one will likely 
or certainly develop a devastating illness, for which there is currently no effective treatment, 
could cause psychological harm such as anxiety, depression and stigma, disrupted family 
dynamics, and worries about loss of or failure to obtain insurance or other social and economic 
benefits such as employment.11-17  Thus, many persons understandably do not wish to know their 
risk marker status, even though they may wish to participate in a prevention trial.  
Approaching such persons for a prevention randomized controlled trial (RCT) raises 
important ethical considerations. RCTs that would require disclosure of risk marker status as part 
of the protocol have been called coercive.7, 8 Designs that accommodate the at-risk persons’ 
desire not to know7, 8, 18  use blinded enrollment. In addition to randomly assigning risk marker 
positive persons to experimental intervention or placebo, the trial enrolls a sample of risk marker 
negative persons (who usually receive a placebo) so that enrollment does not equate to being risk 
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marker positive.  In contrast, in traditional transparent enrollment, only those who are risk 
marker positive are enrolled. 
 As advances in genomics and biomarker-based technologies lead to more prevention 
trials for neurodegenerative diseases, the question of which type of enrollment design—blinded 
versus transparent—is ethically optimal may become a frequently asked question. In the field of 
genetics research, people’s right not to know their genetic information is widely (although not 
universally) defended, even when such information involves medically actionable data.19, 20  A 
similar argument could be made for biomarker results. Given these considerations, a systematic 
ethical analysis of enrollment design may be useful to investigators, Institutional Review Boards 
(IRBs), and regulators as they design future prevention RCTs. 
Prevention trials are of great interest in several neurodegenerative diseases, including 
Huntington disease7 and Parkinson disease.21 Our ethical analysis of the optimal enrollment 
design for prevention RCTs primarily (although not exclusively) focuses on Alzheimer disease 
(AD) prevention clinical trials.  AD is a devastating, lethal disease with a worldwide prevalence 
expected to reach 106 million by 2050.22  AD RCTs are prominent and influential, and could 
potentially set a precedent for prevention RCTs in other fields.  Further, AD prevention RCTs 
target enrollment using a variety of risk markers, ranging from dominantly inherited, highly 
penetrant mutations8, 18 to susceptibility mutations such as APOE e4 and TOM 40 genes,5, 9 and 
biomarkers such as amyloid.6, 23  Some AD prevention RCTs are being conducted with blinded 
enrollment8, 9, 18 while others are planning or are using transparent enrollment.5, 6  There is thus 
an opportunity to compare the ethical implications of various types of risk markers used in 
prevention RCTs. 
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The criteria for what makes clinical research ethical24 are shared by major codes, 
declarations, and other documents relevant to research with human subjects: social value, 
scientific validity, favorable risk-benefit ratio, fair selection of subjects, independent review, 
informed consent, and respect for enrolled subjects.24  For the purposes of this paper, we assume 
that the research at issue has social value, will receive appropriate independent review (e.g., IRB 
review), and focus on enrollment rather than issues following enrollment (the focus of the 
respect for enrolled subjects criterion).  We therefore focus on favorable risk-benefit ratio, 
informed consent, fair subject selection, and scientific validity.  We argue that except for when 
scientific validity requires it, there is in general no ethical requirement for blinded enrollment. 
Notably, avoiding coercion is not the ethical basis for blinded enrollment.   
Favorable risk-benefit ratio 
Given our focus, we put aside the important ethical question of the intervention risks (i.e., 
potential for harm from the experimental intervention, especially when some participants are 
expected not to experience cognitive decline) and examine the risks and burdens of research 
flowing from blinded vs transparent enrollment. 
Risks and Burdens of Transparent Enrollment 
   People who volunteer for AD prevention trials with transparent enrollment will fall into 
two groups: those who are willing to know their risk status at baseline and those who desire not 
to know their risk marker status at baseline but whose desire to participate in a prevention trial 
exceeds that desire not to know.25, 26  
For those willing to find out their risk marker status at baseline, studies to date show that 
these persons will likely cope well with their results. These studies examined both early onset 
Alzheimer disease predictive testing and APOE e4 susceptibility testing.27-31 The results are 
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consistent with studies in Huntington disease and other neurodegenerative disorders.32 A recent 
comprehensive review concluded that extreme, catastrophic reactions are rare, negative effects 
tend to be transient, people do not regret their decision (even among those who test positive), and 
many report benefits of testing.33  Informed persons who want to learn of their risk marker status 
therefore face little risk from that knowledge.34  In fact, many want the opportunity to plan their 
lives with the information and find that knowledge reduces anxiety of uncertainty.25, 27, 35 
Although the number of persons in dominantly inherited mutation disclosure studies is quite 
small and long term follow up data are sparse,36 disclosure of genetic information appears 
reasonably safe when the disclosure is desired. 
In reality, however, an AD prevention RCT would also likely attract those who do not, at 
baseline, desire to find out their risk status but who would nevertheless accept testing and 
disclosure because they wish to be part of the prevention RCT. A small study of persons in 
families with dominantly inherited mutations for AD found that a significant minority of those 
(about 20-46%) who would not otherwise want to know their risk marker status might be willing 
to find out their mutation status, for the sake of participating in AD prevention trials.25 How 
worried should we be about the impact of learning risk-marker result on such persons?   
Research on how people are influenced by and overcome the anticipation of negative 
medical news provides insights to this question.  Patients typically overestimate both the 
intensity and duration of the impact of negative medical events.37, 38  This impact bias is largely 
due to the fact that people tend to focus exclusively on the negative event (sometimes called 
focalism) and fail to incorporate factors such as their ability to adapt and be resilient (immune 
neglect).39  Importantly, this bias can be reduced by making people aware of their tendency 
toward focalism and immune neglect.40 This suggests that when such persons are faced with a 
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choice of entering a transparent enrollment prevention RCT, the choice may create an 
opportunity to see beyond the negative impact of a potential positive test result. For some, this 
may be enough to reduce their impact bias, leading to a decision to volunteer for the RCT.   
Investigators using a transparent enrollment design can further reduce risks to subjects by 
assessing potential subjects’ mood and well-being prior to testing and excluding those whose 
results suggest inordinate degrees of psychological distress.31 These psychological and 
behavioral measures should be monitored over the course of the study as well.   
Finally, transparent enrollment will allow researchers to study the effects of disclosure of 
risk marker status in a population broader than those who would desire disclosure at baseline, 
and will create data about people living with knowledge of being in an asymptomatic at-risk 
stage of a disease. The recent finding that older adult who learned their APOE status performed 
worse on measures of memory and self-rated measures of cognition41 demonstrates the need to 
understand this phenomenon.  
Risks and Burdens of Blinded Enrollment 
Research procedures are rarely flawless. Inadvertent disclosure of risk marker results 
could occur in a blinded enrollment design. Further, risk marker negative persons, blinded to 
their result, may fear or infer that they are risk marker positive from study participation (e.g., 
experiencing health problems not caused by the study but inferred as study side effects25).  Some 
adverse events may require disclosure or de facto reveal the subject’s mutation status.  
Risk marker negative persons enrolled in the blinded placebo cohort face considerable 
burdens, including regular study visits that demand time and include imaging scans, lumbar 
punctures, and, in some studies, receiving placebo injections. These are not high risk procedures 
but their cumulative burdens could be substantial.     
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Informed consent 
Is transparent enrollment coercive? 
One major concern, expressed by investigators of blinded enrollment studies,7, 8 is that 
transparent enrollment is coercive, presumably because persons who are not willing to learn their 
risk marker status are pressured to accept disclosure in order to have the opportunity to 
participate in a prevention trial. If this rationale is correct, then informed consent in a transparent 
design may not be valid.  
However, coercion is in fact not present. The Belmont Report defined coercion as 
occurring when “an overt threat of harm is intentionally presented by one person to another to 
obtain compliance.”42  Suppose an investigator offers a person participation in a transparent 
enrollment trial.  A person who does not want to know his risk marker status may not be 
attracted to the offer, but the offer does not threaten the person with harm or threaten to take 
away a benefit they are otherwise entitled to. Not enrolling simply means the person does not 
have access to the potentially beneficial research intervention but that is not a violation of a right.   
A related argument in support of blinded enrollment is that transparent enrollment 
presents undue influence. Undue influence is defined as “an offer of an excessive, unwarranted, 
inappropriate, or improper reward or other overture in order to obtain compliance.”42  But the 
investigator of a transparent enrollment trial is not exerting undue influence. An offer of 
participating in a clinical trial—which one can freely refuse—is not proposing an “excessive, 
unwarranted, inappropriate, or improper reward” and it is not offered as a means to force the 
person to learn his or her risk marker status.  
 In sum, even if blinded enrollment is sometimes necessary, it is not because transparent 
enrollment entails coercion or undue influence.    
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Special informed consent and disclosure considerations for transparent vs blinded enrollment 
For transparent enrollment, there is a need to optimize people’s understanding in several 
ways. First, some who perhaps reluctantly but freely agree to undergo testing may find out that 
they are risk marker positive but then, after disclosure, find that they have a condition that makes 
them not eligible to enroll. This issue would be most pertinent for those prevention studies using 
susceptibility testing (i.e., APOE e4, or amyloid) where it would be impractical to conduct 
extensive screening before the marker testing. For example, the A4 study performs a screening 
MRI after PET imaging disclosure, meaning some subjects who have elevated amyloid might be 
excluded based on their MRI results.6 
Further, for transparent enrollment, the educational and counseling burden will be 
significant, given the current standards for genetic counseling for AD genetic tests and similar 
counseling needs for biomarker test results.43 Disclosure of negative test results to those who are 
not enrolled will be challenging as well; explaining a negative genetic test result can be complex 
since being negative for a risk marker (e.g., not being a APOE e4 homozygote) does not mean 
one is not at elevated risk for AD (e.g., due to age, or being a heterozygote).  
 For blinded enrollment, the potential subjects need to understand that even if they do not 
have a positive risk marker, they will be undergoing all of the procedures that marker positive 
participants will undergo (except the active intervention), and that this will be only for research 
purposes to mitigate the need to disclose risk marker results. They should also understand that 
adverse events may lead to unblinding.   
Fair Subject Selection 
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The criterion of fair subject selection requires that subjects (and communities) are 
selected for participation based on scientific objectives rather than on other factors and that the 
likelihood and distribution of the benefits and risks of research should be fair.24   
Researchers should not design a study that exploits a vulnerable, conveniently accessible 
population—a practice that has been the source of spectacular ethics scandals.44  But neither 
blinded nor transparent enrollment design raises this concern. Both people who are inclined to 
want to know their risk marker result and those who are not inclined are free to refuse 
participation.  The other major fairness issue is that some populations face a lack of evidence-
based diagnostic and treatment options because they have been excluded from research. This 
concern does not apply to either blinded or transparent designs. There is no scientific basis to 
argue that data from a transparent enrollment trial will not be generalizable to persons who prefer 
not to find out their risk marker status.   
We are here considering fair subject selection criterion only in relation to the issue of 
transparent versus blinded enrollment.  When a study is conducted in a relatively resource poor 
setting, as in a developing country,18 there may be special ethical considerations aside from the 
transparent versus blinded enrollment issue, but that is beyond the scope of this article.  
Scientific Validity 
Considerations of risk-benefit ratio, informed consent, and fair subject selection do not 
yield an obligation to employ blinded enrollment for neurodegenerative disease prevention 
studies. The principle of scientific validity requires the use of rigorous methods to produce valid 
and reliable results24 since an invalid study wastes resources and unnecessarily exposes subjects 
to risks. In some circumstances, scientific validity requires the use of blinded enrollment.  
Page	  11	  of	  19	  
	  
 Highly penetrant dominant mutations that cause Alzheimer disease are rare. Thus, the 
number of persons available for prevention RCTs is relatively small.  Persons who have a family 
history of autosomal dominant Alzheimer disease know they have as much as a 50% risk of 
carrying these mutations, and, if they do carry one, a near certain lifetime risk of developing a 
devastating illness. Although a recent study of persons at risk for early onset AD found baseline 
interest in being tested (not actual tested rate) was 44% (15/34),25 very few people actually 
choose to be tested.  A 2001 clinic-based study of persons at risk for dominantly inherited early 
onset AD or frontal lobe dementia found that only 8.7% chose to be tested. 27 It is also reported 
that “almost no one” among persons at risk for familial AD in the DIAN registry chooses to be 
tested.35 
Although most persons at risk for dominantly inherited mutation may not be willing to 
know their risk marker status, they may be motivated, having witnessed the impact of the illness, 
to participate in a prevention trial for self-regarding (hope for benefit), familial (desire to help 
one’s own children), and altruistic reasons.25  Further, those at risk for such mutations will likely 
be part of a community defined by that risk, whether at the family level or perhaps in larger clan 
cohorts or even a community of unrelated persons brought together by research registries or 
advocacy organizations.35   
In such a situation, the scientific feasibility of the trials could be seriously compromised 
if one were to attempt a transparent enrollment design. If persons who at baseline wish not to 
know their mutation status choose not to participate, then a majority of persons at risk for the 
condition would be excluded. Further, the subset of persons who are not willing to know their 
risk status but still desire to participate in a prevention RCT must choose between two 
unattractive options (not participate when they want to versus finding out their mutation status 
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they would rather not find out).  As discussed above, having to make such a choice does not 
constitute coercion or deny anyone his or her rights. But in such a setting, using a transparent 
enrollment design would be seen as insensitive to the preferences of the community of eligible 
persons.  
This would have not only short term consequences for the feasibility of recruiting from 
this pool of subjects but could also affect the long term relationship between investigators and 
the community of at-risk persons.  Without sufficient trust and collaboration of the community of 
eligible subjects, it would not be possible to conduct the research.  Just as there is no right to 
participate in a research study (no subject can require that a researcher include him in a study), 
no researcher can compel anyone to participate in research. The only option is a mutually 
acceptable, voluntary agreement of cooperation. This highlights the importance of consulting the 
relevant communities during the early stages of trial design to determine their preferences. But 
the ethical principle that necessitates blinded enrollment in such a situation is, ultimately, 
scientific validity: a transparent design may not enroll sufficient numbers of subjects.  The 
potential subjects’ desire not to know their risk marker status does not create, of itself, an 
obligation to use blinded enrollment.   
For other risk markers, the community standards around disclosure that create 
questionable feasibility may not apply. Trials that recruit using APOE e4 and amyloid imaging 
differ in several ways from trials that target rare autosomal dominant mutations.  The recruitment 
pool is much larger. There is high likelihood that people who are interested in knowing their risk 
marker status will self-select in volunteering for the trial; such persons will be more likely to see 
the test results as a potential benefit.  Indeed, it may even be surprising to this group of persons if 
a blinded enrollment were proposed, because that design eliminates one of the benefits of 
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participation.  Also, since there is no socially identifiable group of persons defined by being 
‘amyloid positive,’ for example, community considerations raised in the markers for early onset 
AD will not be an issue.   
There is one prevention trial using a risk algorithm that includes APOE and TOMM40 
mutation results to predict AD in which the participants are blinded to their results.9  That study 
has two official aims: a formal validation of the prediction algorithm in addition to a prevention 
RCT testing pioglitazone.  The blinded enrollment is primarily necessary for rigorous validation 
of the prediction algorithm.  Although some might argue that lack of validation of the algorithm 
ethically precludes disclosure of algorithm results to subjects, the situation is not unique. 
Amyloid imaging and APOE results for asymptomatic persons also have scientific support for 
use in research without explicit validation. Thus, we conclude that the rationale for blinded 
enrollment in this study is to validate the prediction algorithm, not because the prevention RCT 
requires it. 
Conclusion 
Our ability to identify persons at risk for serious neurodegenerative diseases will continue 
to run ahead of our ability to modify those conditions. In the clinic, testing for risk markers for 
such conditions is discouraged because there are no medical benefits to outweigh the 
psychosocial risks and burdens. However, the ability to identify reliable risk markers is crucial to 
conducting prevention trials. But many people, for the very reasons why the risk marker testing 
is discouraged in the clinic, do not want to find out their risk marker status. This is particularly 
true for persons from families with highly penetrant, dominantly inherited, devastating diseases 
such as Huntington disease or AD.  Given that a similar combination of factors— an easily 
identified genetic marker for a serious condition that has no cure or treatment but which may be 
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used to conduct prevention interventions—may occur for many diseases in the future, it is crucial 
to think about an ethical framework to guide design of such prevention studies. 
 Our analysis shows there are no special risk-benefit, informed consent, or fair subject 
selection issues that require blinded enrollment for targeted prevention studies. Transparent 
enrollment is not coercive and does not present undue influence. However, the investigators must 
in some situations use blinded enrollment in order to conduct a valid study.  These situations are 
likely to occur only when the number of eligible subjects are limited and are part of an 
identifiable community whose values and practices reflect a desire for blinded enrollment.  The 
ethical basis for blinded enrollment in such a situation is the requirement of scientific validity, 
not the inherent value of the right not to know one’s risk marker status.  If it is feasible to 
conduct a scientifically valid study with transparent enrollment, then there is no ethical 
requirement to use blinded enrollment. 
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